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China’s Bitcoin Mining Is Back: Why Hashrate Is Rising Again?

China’s Bitcoin Mining Is Back: Why Hashrate Is Rising Again?

China banned industrial Bitcoin mining in 2021. For a time, the country’s share of global hashrate seemed to vanish. Yet four years on, activity is quietly returning—enough to register in multiple data sets and newsrooms. Here’s what the most credible sources suggest is really happening and why it matters.

From dominance to prohibition—then a slow rebound

Beijing’s clampdown began in May 2021 when the State Council vowed to “crack down on bitcoin mining and trading” to curb financial risks and energy waste. By September, the People’s Bank of China declared all crypto transactions illegal, cementing a comprehensive ban. Hashrate fell sharply as large operators shut down or left the country.

The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) documented the immediate exodus and—crucially—the seasonal dynamics that once defined Chinese mining, with rigs migrating to Sichuan’s wet-season hydropower before the ban. That historical pattern explains why pockets of activity might reappear wherever electricity is cheap and plentiful.

By early 2022, Cambridge’s Bitcoin Mining Map showed China’s share reemerging—evidence that some operators had resumed activity underground or in new guises. While methodology and visibility limits apply, the map’s post-ban readings challenged the idea that China’s hashrate had gone to zero.

What’s driving the new uptick in 2025

1) Energy economics: cheap, stranded, or seasonal power

Mining is a brutally simple business: low-cost electricity + efficient hardware = margin. Academic work on China’s mining geography highlights how rainy-season hydropower in Sichuan historically attracted miners from drier regions. With renewable buildout accelerating, curtailment can create pockets of very low marginal power costs, tempting covert operators back despite legal risk.

2) Data-center boom and cover

Fresh reporting from the South China Morning Post says miners are piggybacking on a data-center buildout and exploiting inexpensive electricity in certain provinces. Some operations reportedly operate in the shadows or blend into broader compute campuses, making enforcement harder and creating a path for hashrate to creep higher. In late November 2025, SCMP estimated China’s share of global hashrate rose from 13.75% in Q1 2025 to 14.06% in the current quarter—modest but measurable.

3) Better rigs, smaller footprints

Newer ASICs pack more terahash per kilowatt, shrinking site footprints and power signatures. While not a permission slip to defy the ban, higher efficiency makes smaller, distributed farms economically viable, which again complicates detection. Cointelegraph’s explainer connects this hardware trend with a wider post-ban recalibration by operators.

4) Persistent domestic demand for crypto

Trading isn’t the same as mining, but local demand influences incentives. In early 2024, Reuters, citing Chainalysis, reported an estimated $86.4 billion in crypto transaction volume in China (July 2022–June 2023), much of it via OTC and gray-market P2P channels. That level of grassroots activity sustains a market for services around Bitcoin—mining included—even if participants must operate discreetly.

The law hasn’t changed—but incentives have

Be clear: the ban still stands. Experts quoted by SCMP say Beijing is unlikely to lift it, despite excess renewable generation in some regions. That keeps enforcement risk high for operators and creates uncertainty for power providers, landlords, and logistics firms tempted by mining revenue. Yet where cheap, intermittent power meets portable, efficient hardware, the calculus for small-to-mid mining resurfaces.

What the credible data really shows

  • Cambridge’s post-ban map: China’s share reappears in 2022 and beyond, with caveats about measurement in a gray market. The key takeaway is direction: not dominance, but non-zero and stubbornly present.
  • SCMP’s quarterly snapshot (Nov. 30, 2025): a rising share to ~14%, plus on-the-ground reporting about data centers and cheap power pockets.
  • Cointelegraph’s explainer (Nov. 28–29, 2025): synthesizes the post-ban arc—dominance → ban → rebound—and ties the resurgence to energy costs and stealthier operations.

Together, these sources sketch a consistent picture: China is no longer the center of Bitcoin mining—but it’s not out of the picture.

Why this matters beyond China

Network security & distribution. Hashrate concentration anywhere raises governance and outage risks; the post-2021 dispersion was seen as healthy. A China rebound to mid-teens share doesn’t recreate old concentration, but it reminds us how energy economics—not policy alone—shape hashrate geography. Cambridge’s research has long emphasized the sensitivity of hashrate to regional power seasons and prices.

Energy transition optics. The rebound intersects with China’s renewables curtailment story: more solar and wind can mean more wasted generation when grids can’t absorb it. Some policymakers see flexible loads like data centers—and, controversially, mining—as one outlet. Whether that flies under the ban is a separate question. SCMP’s reporting highlights the oversupply in some regions as a factor.

Enforcement cycles. China’s crackdowns have historically come in waves: announcements, inspections, and targeted shutdowns. With activity creeping up, the next wave—or a sharper clarifying policy—could arrive quickly. The original 2021 State Council decision shows how fast conditions can change.

Conclusion

China’s bitcoin mining is not back to its pre-ban dominance—but it is back, enough to register in Cambridge data and be visible to reporters on the ground. The drivers are classic: cheap or stranded power, better hardware, and the gravitational pull of a still-active domestic crypto economy. The law remains unchanged, and enforcement risk is real. But energy economics are hard to legislate away, which is why a non-zero, growing share of global hashrate is again settling in China’s energy-rich pockets. Expect the push-and-pull—between policy and profit—to continue into 2026.